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Freedom of Speech & Election Day
at the Polls: Thou Doth Protest
Too Much
by James J. Woodruff 11*
Without Freedom of Thought, there can be no such Thing as Wisdom;
and no such Thing as publi[c] Liberty, without Freedom of Speech;
which is the Right of every Man, as far as by it, he does not hurt or
contr[ol] the Right of another: And this is the only Check it ought to
suffer, and the only Bounds it ought to know.
This sacred Privilege is so essential to free Governments, that the
Security of Property, and the Freedom of Speech always go together;
and in those wretched Countries where a Man cannot call his Tongue
his own, he can scarce call any Thing else his own.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

You are a student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
showing up at the polling place to cast your ballot on election day in
another historic presidential election. You are excited and cannot wait

* Associate Professor of Lawyering Process, Florida Coastal School ofLaw. Texas A&M
University (B.S., 1998); South Texas College of Law (J.D., 2001). Editor in Chief,
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. (2000-2001). Member, State Bars of Florida and Texas.
I would like to thank Florida Coastal School of Law for the generous summer research
grant it provided so that I could complete this work. I would also like to thank my wife,
Stephanie Woodruff, for her support and assistance in this effort; she has been invaluable.
The title of this Article is based on the famous line by Shakespeare, "The lady doth
protest too much methinks." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE
OF DENMARK, act 3, sc. 2.

1. Benjamin Franklin, Letter to the Editor, Letterfrom Silence Dogood No. VIII, NEWENGLAND COURANT (Boston) No. 49, Mon., July 2 to Mon., July 9, 1722, at Al (front page)
(quoting JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO'S LETTERS 96 (London, John

Trenchard, Thomas Gordan & J. Peele prtg. 1720)), available at www.masshist.org/data
base/viewer.php?item id=645&mode=large&img-step=1.

331

332

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

to exercise your right to vote. You just know that your candidate is the
right person for the job and the opposition's candidate is the reason for
all the country's problems.
As you get closer to the table where the poll worker is checking people
in to vote, you see a young woman get turned away because she is
wearing a button for a presidential candidate's campaign.2 Then, the
next person in line is turned away for wearing a button asking the poll
worker to "Please I.D. Me."' It is an odd slogan, and not one you would
relate to any specific politician. Only one person is left in front of you
in line. She wears a yellow shirt with a coiled rattlesnake on it and the
words "Don't Tread on Me.' A history nut, you think (as you recall the
Gadsden Flag from your high-school history class). You overhear the
poll worker tell her that she needs to go to the restroom to turn the shirt
inside out before she will be allowed to vote.
Now it is your turn to show the poll worker your voter registration
card and sign in to vote. You are suddenly told that you cannot vote
because of your sweatshirt. You are confused. You cannot believe it.
You ask, "What is wrong with my sweatshirt?" The poll worker
responds, "It's a Mitt Romney Campaign sweatshirt. You must remove
it before you will be allowed to vote." Now you are really confused-your
sweatshirt says M.I.T., as in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.'
Scenarios as illustrated above occur in a number of states during every
election cycle. On election day, electors and campaigns are faced with
a myriad of restrictions on what they can say, wear, and display at the
polls.6 This is not something they are faced with every day, as elections
occur in some places as infrequently as every other year-hardly frequent
enough to allow the general public to become familiar with a jurisdic-

2. Based on Kimberly J. Tucker's experience wearing a "John Kerry for President"
button (Democratic Party candidate for President in 2004) while voting in Virginia during
the 2004 presidential election. Kimberly J. Tucker, "You Can't Wear That to Vote": The
Constitutionalityof State Laws Prohibitingthe Wearing of PoliticalMessage Buttons at
Polling Places, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 61, 61 (2006).
3. Several grassroots organizations and individuals planned on wearing buttons that
stated, "Please I.D. Me" to the polling place on Election Day. Minn. Majority v. Mansky,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116240 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2010).
4. Id. At least one of the individuals involved in the Minnesota Majority case sought
to wear such a shirt. Id.
5. MIT Voters Flagged at Polls for Suspected Electioneering, Explain They're Not
Shillingfor Mitt Romney, HUFFINGTON POST (updated Nov. 6, 2012,8:23 PM), http//www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/06/mit-voters-flagged-at-polls-for-suspected-electioneering
explain-not-shilling-for-romney.n_2084332.html.
6. See Tucker, supra note 2, at 62-66 (discussing election process regulations in a fiftystate survey and categorizing states based on the particular conduct restricted).

ELECTION DAY AT THE POLLS

2014]

333

tion's election laws.7 While some states have broad, sweeping restrictions affecting both electors and political campaigns, other states have
much less severe restrictions or no restrictions at all.' The result of
these restrictions is the limitation of political expression at the very
place where such expression may have the most impact-the polling
place. These restrictions bewilder the campaigns for less popular offices
as they work to get their message out.'
This Article seeks to answer the following question: What are the
actual limits the government can place on political speech at and around
the polling place? In examining this question, this Article argues that
some of the current limitations placed on polling-place activities are
unconstitutional. Specifically, this Article focuses on the wearing of
political slogans and images within the polling room and campaign-free
zone and the placement of campaign signs within the campaign-free
zone.-o Part II will examine the interpretation of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clausen under both an originalist and policy-based
philosophy when applied to passive electioneering. Part III will discuss
whether the statutes prohibiting passive electioneering are constitutional.
II.

REGULATING POLITICAL EXPRESSION UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of

7. This becomes even more of an issue as the transient nature of our population may
lead an individual to vote in a different jurisdiction during each election cycle. Adding to
the confusion may be the lack of uniform enforcement of election laws by election officials,
but that will be discussed later in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 200-05;
see also Tucker, supra note 2, at 82-84 (exemplifying arbitrary enforcement of voter
expression restrictions in several states).
8. See Robert Brett Dunham, Defoliatingthe Grassroots:Election Day Restrictionson
PoliticalSpeech, 77 GEo. L.J. 2137, 2158-59 (1989) (discussing the importance of electionday campaigning to candidates seeking less visible offices).
9. See infra notes 142-43.
10. This is a term commonly called "passive electioneering." For the purposes of this
Article, I will be limiting my analysis to non-vocal electioneering. Examples of this, which
from time to time will be referred to as "electioneering paraphernalia," are campaign
buttons, shirts, stickers, and any other type of messaging device a voter may wear. The
range of messaging on the election paraphernalia will include logos, names, and slogans
associated with political parties, campaigns, or initiatives. With regard to signs, our
examination will be regarding signs that include names, logos, slogans, and any other type
of reference that may be placed on a sign that would allow the viewer to associate the sign
with a particular candidate, party, or initiative.
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.12
Government cannot function if anyone can say anything anywhere at
any time. And so we quickly come to the conclusion that lines must be
drawn, differentiations made.13
These two quotes put the issue before us into perspective and
illustrate what strikes at the center of the passive electioneering
controversy. The Constitution's express terms do not place any
limitations on the freedom of speech, political or otherwise, which may
lead some to believe there are no restrictions on speech. Such an
interpretation is both unworkable and unrealistic." Determining what
restrictions are allowed becomes a murkier issue as one faces the current
state of the constitutional-interpretation debate. This requires us to
pose this question: What philosophy should be followed to examine our
quandary? For decades, and possibly centuries, there has been a debate
over how the Constitution should be interpreted."
This Article provides both an originalist" and policy-based analysis." From this we will see how these two philosophies will resolve the

12. Id.
13. Robert Bork, NeutralPrinciplesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,47 IND. L.J.
1, 21 (1971).
14. Common examples of such language that should and preferably could be regulated
are defamatory statements, mutiny, and treason. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 285 (1964) (stating that "the rule is that we 'examine for ourselves the statements in
issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see . . . whether they are of
a character which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.') (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331, 335 (1946)). After all, it would make little sense to allow a First Amendment defense
to overcome the damages done because of defamation. Such a result would not respect the
property right of the defamed, but would reward the plundering action of the defamer.
Defamation was a well-known tort to the founding generation. See, e.g., WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 150-53 (Univ. Chicago Press

(reprint) 1769), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edulfounders/documentsamendlspeechs4.html.
15. Lorianne Updike Toler, J. Carl Cecere & Justice Don Willett, Pre-"Originalism",36
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 277, 279 (2013) [hereinafter Toler] (discussing the history of
constitutional interpretative philosophy through the examination of ninety-six United
States Supreme Court cases of first impression).
16. While some could argue that using such a methodology is nothing more than trying
to read the minds of those long dead, this is an oversimplification similar to the argument
that the Constitution is no longer valid because it is over two hundred years old.
17. Toler, Cecere, and Willet have chosen to refer to this philosophy as "[njon[olriginalist." Toler, supra note 15, at 296. Such a description does not adequately describe
the philosophy followed by those not enticed by originalism. Based on the wealth of case
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same question. First, we will examine an originalist's view regarding
the regulation of speech at the polling place. This will be followed by a
policy-based view of regulating speech at the polling place.

A.

An Originalist'sView of Regulating Speech at the Polling Place"

In 1905, the United States Supreme Court in South Carolinav. United
States" stated, "The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its
meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted it means
now."2 0 This built upon the Supreme Court's 1838 pronouncement that:
The solution of this [Constitutional question] must necessarily depend
on the words of the [Clonstitution; the meaning and intention of the
convention which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification
to the conventions of the people of and in the several states; together
with a reference to such sources ofjudicial information as are resorted
to by all courts in construing statutes, and to which this Court has
always resorted in construing the [C]onstitution. 2'
This was further discussed in Justice Clarence Thomas's concurrence in

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission2 2 where he opined what is to be
done when an issue of first impression arises." In those situations, the
Supreme Court is to look at "what history reveals was the contemporane-

law before us, it would appear that a better description of the non-originalists would be
policy-based interpreters. It is, after all, the policy the judges seek to see put forward that
governs the results and not, as they might see it, the stodgy language of a centuries-old
document known as the Constitution.
18. In the interest of approaching a complicated genre of constitutional interpretation,
I have restricted the forms of originalism that will be the basis of examination. It is my
hope that by using the selections focusing on the Founders' intent (intentionalism) and the
understanding of the general public in 1791 (original public meaning), we can derive as
close as possible the true meaning of the Freedom of Expression Clause.
19. 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
20. Id. at 448.
21. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 721 (1838). This is not the earliest
such mention of originalist philosophy. Justice Marshall stated, in a dissenting opinion in
1827:
To say that the intention of the instrument must prevail; that this intention must
be collected from its words; that its words are to be understood in that sense in
which they are generally used by those for whom the instrument was intended;
that its provisions are neither to be restricted into insignificance, nor extended to
objects not comprehended in them, nor contemplated by its framers; - is to repeat
what has been already said more at large, and is all that can be necessary.
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
22. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
23. Id. at 360 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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ous understanding of [the Establishment Clause's] guarantees."2 4 The
Supreme Court, among other sources, provides a strong foundation for
the originalist philosophy.
Originalism as a constitutional-interpretive philosophy was applied to
the First Amendment in Robert Bork's work Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems.2 5 In that work, he refined the
originalist philosophy and provided a method that could be adopted and
give some sense of predictability to the outcome of constitutional
cases.26 His approach picked up on a method that had been sporadically used throughout the history of the United States and has spawned
many different, but similar, methodologies for determining what
constitutional provisions mean.27 Judge Bork, then Professor Bork,
looked to the common understanding of the Constitution's terms at the
time of ratification.2 8 In his work he brought the constitutional
interpretation back in line with the Fuller Court.29
A review of the historical record surrounding the ratification of the
Free Speech Clause shows that nothing of significance was raised
regarding the topic during the ratification process.o This lack of
debate in the founding era became apparent when the issue of the
original drafters and ratifiers' understanding of the First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause arose in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission."
In McIntyre, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas both attempted and
failed to find a definitive understanding of what the First Amendment's
drafters and ratifiers would have understood freedom of speech to mean

24. Id. at 359 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673
(1984)).
25. Bork, supra note 13, at 1.
26. Id. at 8.
27. Id. at 20. According to Toler, Cecere, and Willett's work Pre-"Originalism,"the
basic schools of originalism are intentionalism and original public meaning. Toler, supra
note 15, at 290-94. They broke intentionalism down into the philosophies of framers'
intentionalism and ratifiers' intentionalism (or understanding). Id. at 290-91. Under
framers' intentionalism, the focus is placed on the intent of the fifty-five members of the
constitutional convention. See id. at 290-91. Ratifiers' intentionalism focuses on the intent
of the state conventions that ratified the Constitution. See id. at 292.
Original public meaning is broken into at least three philosophies: original public
understanding, semantic originalism, and original methods originalism. Id. at 293-95.
28. Bork, supra note 13, at 22.
29. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice, Public Opinion, and the Fuller Court, 49
VAND. L. REV. 373, 378-84 (1996) (reviewing JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP

OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910 (1995)) (explaining the Fuller Court's deference to the
Founders' intent when deciding constitutional issues).
30. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and of the Press,in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO
THE CONSTITUTION 311, 311-12 (Edwin Meese III et al., eds., 2005).
31. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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from the limited records prepared of the debates at any of the groups'
conventions.3 2
Regardless of the lack of convention records, there is still a way to
come to an understanding of what the drafters and members of the
ratifying conventions would have believed the Free Speech Clause to
mean. We can appreciate what the political class (made up of the
ratifiers, drafters, and voters) at the time of the First Amendment's
ratification would have understood by reviewing the history of the
polling place in the United States.
Americans have been exposed to various methods of voting since the
country's colonial days. These methods have included voting viva voce
(by word of mouth),33 bean counts," showing of hands," and handwritten ballots. Some of these methods were very public and, as one
can imagine, led to an election-day experience that was quite different
than most elections today.37 To understand the use of voting methods
is to understand the atmosphere at the polling place.
Originally, the colonies followed the English method of voting.3" That
is, elections were held viva voce or by a showing of hands," and
electors would meet at a designated location and express their vote by
voice or by raising their hands.40 Both methods initially required the
presence of the elector, but eventually a proxy system developed.
John Sergeant Wise described the Virginia general election of 1855, held
viva voce, as follows:
In due course came election day. Father being absent, the young
cousin above referred to represented him at the polling-place, and took
me with him. In those days, voting was done openly, or viva voce, as
it was called, and not by ballot. The election judges, who were magistrates, sat upon a bench with their clerks before them. Where practicable, it was customary for the candidate to be present in person, and to

32. Id. at 360-62, 373-74.
33. ELDON COBB EvANs, A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES 3 (Univ. Chicago Libraries, private ed. 1917); J.A.C. CHANDLER & T.B. THAMES,
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 276 (Times-Dispatch Co. 1917).
34. EvANS, supra note 33, at 1.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2.
37. The exception is the caucusing often seen during primary elections.
38. EvANS, supra note 33, at 1.
39. See id.
40.

Id.

41. See id. The proxy system allowed landholders to vote from their residences or by
sending a proxy. CORTLANDT F. BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN
COLONIES 279 (New York, Columbia College 1893).
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occupy a seat at the side of the judges. As the voter appeared, his
name was called out in a loud voice. The judges inquired, "John Jones
(or Bill Smith), for whom do you vote?"-for governor, or for whatever
was the office to be filled. He replied by proclaiming the name of his
favorite. Then the clerks enrolled the vote, and the judges announced
it as enrolled. The representative of the candidate for whom he voted
arose, bowed, and thanked him aloud; and his partisans often
applauded."
While viva voce was the English method of voting adopted by the
original colonies, it did not remain the status quo for long." Through
experience and practice, most of the colonies adopted other means of
conducting elections." One of those methods that is employed to this
day is the use of paper ballots."
The original paper-ballot system took many different forms. The
ballots were usually provided by the individual voter, party, candidate,
or newspaper prior to the election.4 6 These ballots would be made of
different types of paper and could be found in a broad range of colors.47
Electors were solicited for their vote at the polling place door, and the
"correct" ballots were distributed.4 8 Electors who did not want to vote
for a party's complete ticket could tear off or cross out the candidates
they did not wish to vote for while writing in those they wanted to
add." A candidate's only barrier to an election was his ability to print
a ballot and get it in the hands of electors on election day.so As there
were no qualification deadlines to run for most offices, a politician could
face a new opponent all the way up until the close of the polls."

42.

JOHN S. WISE, THE END OF AN ERA 55-56 (Boston & New York: The Riverside

Press, Cambridge 1899) (emphasis omitted for style).
43. See BISHOP, supra note 41, at 127.
44. See id.
45. R. MICHAEL ALvAREZ & THAD E. HALL, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN
ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 221 (2010).

46. Id. at 220; see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,200-06 (1992); George v. Mun.
Election Comm'n, 516 S.E.2d 206, 209 (S.C. 1999).
47. ALVEREz & HALL, supra note 45, at 220.
48. See id.
49. Get Out The Vote: Tickets & Ballots, CORNELL UNIV. LIBRARY (Sept. 13, 2006),
available at httpl//rmc.library.cornell.edu/vote/tickets.
50. See BISHOP, supra note 41, at 126-27 (discussing a lack of political-nomination
procedures for candidates seeking office in colonial America).
51. See id. at 120.
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B. A Policy-Based View of Regulating Speech at the Polling Place
The other commonly found method of constitutional interpretation is
a policy-based philosophy.52 Often referred to as a living Constitution
approach or values-based decision making, 3 this philosophy looks at
the issue before the court and determines what the best policy would be
to resolve the issue.54 This policy may be based on human experience,
precedent, social science, history, current understanding of words as
opposed to their meaning at the time of the underlying document's
creation or adoption, or any other means of forming an opinion without
Sometimes the policy used fits
regard to originalist philosophy."
squarely into the language of the Constitution, and sometimes the
Constitution's language is given little regard."
There is a wealth of examples of this in Supreme Court opinions.
Policy-based analysis is engaged in, to some extent, when developing the
many commonly followed rules that determine whether one act violates
some constitutional precept. For our purposes, the issue is to determine
if regulating passive electioneering violates the First Amendment's Free
Speech Clause.
The key to a policy-based analysis begins with the question of whether
the regulation is targeting a specific viewpoint when regulating
speech." To begin our journey we start with the presumption that
content-based speech regulations are invalid." In Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC," the Court held that content-based speech
restrictions must meet strict scrutiny to be constitutional.o The
regulations must be both viewpoint-neutral and subject-matter neutral

52. Bork, supra note 13, at 17. The reason why an examination of current scholarship
on media, electronic or print, is being used to examine the issue rather than recent
Supreme Court opinions is because the policy-based approach is rather fickle. Id. at 8. By
taking from the currently existing material on the issue at hand we are better able to
predict the outcomes a group of justices using policy-based reasoning may reach. This, of
course, could change, and a policy-based result might look radically different a decade from
now. By its very nature, the policy-based method is a rather undemocratic way of
determining a case's outcome as it focuses more on the morals or values of a small, elite
group of Supreme Court justices rather than on the morals or values of society at large.
Id. at 5-6.
53. Id. at 17.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 22.
56. Id. at 22-23.
57. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
58. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
59. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
60. Id. at 640-41.
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to escape strict scrutiny." When a regulation is examined under strict
scrutiny, the government always has the burden of proof (regardless of
its standing as a plaintiff or a defendant).62 To pass muster under
strict scrutiny, the regulation must be (1) justified by a compelling
government interest;" (2) narrowly tailored to achieve the interest;'
and (3) the least restrictive means for achieving that interest.65
If the policy-based examination of strict scrutiny is not difficult
enough, the location where the speech is to be regulated further
complicates the analysis. To determine whether the regulated speech
can pass constitutional muster, the Supreme Court has created three
forums that alter the freedom of expression analysis: traditional public,
designated public, and non-public.66 These judicially created forums
have a major impact on the constitutionality of laws aimed at restricting
67
expression.
A traditional public forum is a place "which by long tradition or by
government fiat [has] been devoted to assembly and debate."68 A
designated public forum is property made available by the government
for the public to use as a forum for speech.69 The state may restrict, in
a content-based manner, any speech made in a traditional or designated
public forum if it shows the restrictions are:
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that [they are]
narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The State may also enforce
regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication."
A non-public forum is a forum that the government has not designated
as a public forum, nor was it a traditional public forum." Speech
restrictions must be "reasonable and viewpoint-neutral."7 2 Speech in

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
Burson, 504 U.S. at 198.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 45-46; Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 478 (2009).
Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 46.
Summum, 555 U.S. at 461.
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limited public forums is also subject to regulation of time, place, and
manner.73
Printed material, whether on shirts, buttons, or signs, is protected as
free speech under the First Amendment.7 4 This is well illustrated in
the school cases heard by the Supreme Court. These cases also illustrate
a combination of the earlier- described issues of content-based speech
regulation and the effect location has on such speech.
1. The School Cases. The closest comparison to the polling place
that we routinely encounter is the schoolyard.7 ' The public routinely
encounters speech restrictions when they are attending primary and
secondary school.7 ' These restrictions affect what clothes can be worn
in addition to what signs may be displayed or language used. While
the polling place is only available to the public on a limited basis (we
only hold elections every so often and allow voting for a limited period
of days), there are some similarities that are useful in analyzing pollingplace speech restrictions. For instance, we are not trying to educate
voters at the polling place, whereas that is the key goal of schools. We
do, nonetheless, have to deal with the same discipline issues at these
two locations. Just as students using speech to act out can cause
distraction in the classroom and thereby inhibit teaching, voters
engaging in certain speech can likewise inhibit the process of getting
voters in and out of the polling place. It is this discipline issue that is
the strongest link between the two.
The Supreme Court has held that students are allowed to express
opinions regarding controversial subjects at school." This allowance,
however, is not an absolute right."
A student's speech may be
curtailed if it materially and substantially interferes with the school's
educational mission by materially disrupting class-work, creating
substantial disorder, or invading the rights of other students."
Examples of such behavior include: lewd or indecent speech,8 ' speech

73. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
74. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
75. While government-enforced speech restrictions are routinely found on government
military facilities, these places are not routinely found open to the public, as public schools
are. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
76. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
77. See, e.g., id. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 511 (majority opinion).
79. Id. at 512-13.
80. Id. at 513-14.
81. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
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advocating drug or alcohol use,8 2 irresponsible sex, or conduct not
consistent with the shared values of society." This authority to curtail
student speech extends to school-related activities occurring outside of
school hours or activities that are school-sponsored."
The United States Supreme Court has encountered the issue of
restrictions on student speech on several occasions during the past
several decades. On each occasion the boundaries of student speech, or
more precisely, the limitations on one's First Amendment right to free
speech have been established. Among all the cases, the key to these
restrictions is acknowledging that the challenges of maintaining order
in an educational environment is important.
2. Common Speech Restrictions on Political Speech in the
Polling Room and Campaign-Free Zone. Robert Dunham's work,
Defoliating the Grassroots: Election Day Restrictions on Political
M classified the expression restrictions found in the polling room
Speech,8
and campaign-free zone into two classifications: "political free zones" and
"politically restricted zones."87 I find these classifications are still
accurate in describing the legal landscape of speech restrictions in the
states' campaign-free zones.
Political-free zones are the most restrictive of the classifications.88
These zones prohibit any type of political activity within them.89 These
restrictions usually prohibit anyone from remaining in a campaign-free
zone except for voters and election officials."o Campaign signs and
regalia are also banned from the zone." Voters are required to remove
any campaign regalia before entering the campaign-free zone. 2
Such a political free zone is illustrated in North Dakota's law
regulating the campaign-free zone and polling place. Its law states:

82. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlneier,
484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988).
83. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272.
84.

Id.

85. Id. at 273 (allowing schools to exercise control over the style and content of schoolsponsored student newspapers).
86. Dunham, supra note 8.
87. Id. at 2143-44.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2144.
91. Id. (quoting IOWA CODE ANN. § 49.107(1) (West Supp. 1988) (repealed)).
92. Id. at 2181 n.241.
93. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-03 (2011).
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No individual may buy, sell, give, or provide any political badge,
button, or any insignia within a polling place or within one hundred
feet [30.48 meters] from the entrance to the room containing the
polling place while it is open for voting. No such political badge, button,
or insignia may be worn within that same area while a polling place is
open for voting.
North Dakota's law creates an atmosphere that is completely sterilized
of any political messaging. If unwary electors enter a political-free zone
while wearing campaign messaging, they may be asked to remove the
messaging or reverse their shirt before entering the zone."
Politically restricted zones are less restrictive than political-free
zones.9 6
Florida's expression restrictions in the polling place and
campaign-free zone present a good example of a politically restricted
zone." Florida's statute states as follows:
(4)(a) No person, political committee, committee of continuous
existence, or other group or organization may solicit voters inside the
polling place or within 100 feet of the entrance to any polling place, or
polling room where the polling place is also a polling room, or early
voting site. Before the opening of the polling place or early voting site,
the clerk or supervisor shall designate the no-solicitation zone and
mark the boundaries.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, the terms "solicit" or "solicitation" shall include, but not be limited to, seeking or attempting to seek
any vote, fact, opinion, or contribution; distributing or attempting to
distribute any political or campaign material, leaflet, or handout;
conducting a poll except as specified in this paragraph; seeking or
attempting to seek a signature on any petition; and selling or
attempting to sell any item. The terms "solicit" or "solicitation" shall
not be construed to prohibit exit polling.
(c) Each supervisor of elections shall inform the clerk of the area
within which soliciting is unlawful, based on the particular characteristics of that polling place. The supervisor or the clerk may take any
reasonable action necessary to ensure order at the polling places,
including, but not limited to, having disruptive and unruly persons
removed by law enforcement officers from the polling room or place or
from the 100-foot zone surrounding the polling place."

94. Id. (bracketed material in original)
95. See generally Tucker, supra note 2 (describing a poll worker's response to the
inquiry of what would be done if Professor Tucker had worn a campaign shirt).
96. Dunham, supra note 8, at 2144.
97. FLA. STAT. § 102.031(4) (2011).
98. Id.
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As exemplified by Florida's statute, politically restricted zones allow
for the presence of some campaign messaging. Unlike political free
zones, in politically restricted zones voters are allowed to wear campaign, party, or initiative paraphernalia. The completely politically
sterilized environment found in political-free zones is absent in
politically restricted zones."
To focus on how the polling place and its surrounding area is
regulated, we shall break the area surrounding the voting machine into
three different zones: the polling room, the campaign-free zone, and the
area outside the campaign-free zone. Each of these zones will be
discussed individually and the speech restrictions analyzed accordingly.
a. The Polling Room. The polling room may be located in a
government or non-government owned building and is where voting
actually takes place. Generally, when electors enter the polling room
they receive their ballots, mark their ballots in a booth or other device
to ensure secrecy regarding their vote, and place the marked ballot into
the ballot box. The state may limit who may enter and remain in the
polling room. 0o
The polling place has been described as a non-public forum.' 0 1 This
description has been supported by the belief that it has not "immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
...

been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts

between citizens, and discussing public questions." 10 2 As seen in the
previous part providing a brief history of the polling room in the United
States, the polling room has long been a public forum. Even today
during the primary season, the polling room is still used as a place for
public assembly. Regardless, we shall excuse this oversight as we
continue the journey through the policy-based philosophy.
It is in the polling room that passive electioneering encounters
governmental speech restrictions. Several cases have arisen regarding
statutes that prohibit the wearing of stickers, buttons, and other election
paraphernalia in the polling room. 0 s
The issue of passive electioneering by wearing a campaign sticker
when voting was the topic of Marlin v. District of Columbia Board of
Elections & Ethics.1 " In Marlin, the plaintiff filed suit in the United

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Dunham, supra note 8, at 2144.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 102.031(3Xa) (2011).
Marlin v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 236 F.3d 716, 718 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
E.g., Marlin, 236 F.3d. at 717-18; Minn. Majority, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116240.
236 F.3d 716, 717 (2001).
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States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge two of the
District of Columbia's election regulations. One of the regulations
banned political activity "in, on, or within a reasonable distance outside
the building used as a polling or vote counting place.""os The other
defined "political activity" to include "any activity intended to persuade
a person to vote for or against any candidate or measure or to desist
from voting."c'
When the plaintiff went to vote in the primary election, he wore a
sticker endorsing a candidate for mayor. When the plaintiff attempted
to turn in his completed ballot, a poll worker told him that he was not
allowed to cast his vote while wearing the sticker. After a second poll
worker accepted the plaintiff's ballot, the first poll worker told the
plaintiff that "he would not be permitted to vote in the general election
if he was wearing 'any sticker, button, emblem, or clothing that showed
support for a candidate."'10 7 After the primary election but before the
general election, the plaintiff filed his lawsuit challenging the district's
election regulations that restricted his ability to wear campaign
paraphernalia. The plaintiff did vote in the general election, but had to
vote curbside since he was wearing political paraphernalia.0 s
The plaintiff appealed the district court's ruling that the ban on
political activity was constitutional.0 ' The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Coumbia upheld the trial court's ruling."o
Both courts found that the polling room was a non-public forum and
"that the political activity ban [was] a reasonable view-point neutral
regulation.""'
In Minnesota Majority v. Mansky,"2 the plaintiffs planned on
wearing "Northstar Tea Party tee-shirts or Election Integrity Watch
buttons that state[d] 'Please I.D. Me.""'" The shirts bore different
slogans, including "Don't Tread on Me" and "Fiscal Responsibility,
Limited Government, Free Markets."" 4 The buttons depicted an eye,
"a telephone
number, and a website address including the word 'integri15
ty.""

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 718 (citing 3 D.C. MUN. REGS. § 708.4).
Id. (quoting 3 D.C. MUN. REGS. § 708.8).
Id. (quoting trial court record).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 116240 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2010).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *2.
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The plaintiffs, made up of private citizens and institutional organizations, were proactive in their efforts and filed a lawsuit in the Federal
District Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking a temporary
restraining order and injunction in anticipation of their shirts and
buttons being banned at the polling place."
All the institutional
organizations were self-described "grass roots coalition[s]."1n
At issue was the following statute:
A person may not display campaign material, post signs, ask, solicit,
or in any manner try to induce or persuade a voter within a polling
place or within 100 feet of the building in which a polling place is
situated, or anywhere on the public property on which a polling place
is situated, on primary or election day to vote for or refrain from voting
for a candidate or ballot question. A person may not provide political
badges, political buttons, or other political insignia to be worn at or
about the polling place on the day of a primary or election. A political
badge, political button, or other political insignia may not be worn at
or about the polling place on primary or election day."'
The statute created an interpretive issue because it restricted "political
material" rather than "campaign material.""'
By using the term
"political" it would appear that the restrictions on what messages may
be worn to a polling place are highly restrictive. This could include
messages as mundane as a school's name,1 20 a patriotic message,121
or even a specific color.122
On November 1, 2010, the court heard the plaintiffs' motion for a
temporary restraining order seeking to "enjoin[,] [the] [d]efendants from
preventing the individual [p]laintiffs from entering the polling place and
voting while wearing Tea Party apparel and the 'Please I.D. Me'

116. Id. at *3-4. The complaint alleged three counts: "(1) that Minnesota Statute [§
211B.11, subdivision 1, is a facially unconstitutional restriction on First Amendment rights;
(2) that [§] 211B.11 as applied to prohibit wearing the tee-shirts and buttons violates [the]
[pilaintiffs' federal constitutional rights under the First Amendment; and (3) that [§]
211B.11 as applied to prohibit wearing the tee-shirts and buttons violates [the] [p]laintiffs'
state constitutional rights to free speech and association." Id. at *3.
117. Id. at *2.
118. Id. at *4 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 211B.11, subdiv. 1 (2008)).
119. Id. The court did notice this and used this distinction to broadly interpret what
is covered under the statute. Id. at *5.
120. For example, a shirt displaying the name of a religious school may be determined
to be political in nature by certain individuals and not allowed into the polling place.
121. Messages such as common statements like "God Bless America," "Live Free or
Die," or "Support Our Troops" could fall under the ban.
122. Since the 2000 presidential election, red has been associated with the Republican
Party and blue with the Democratic Party. The wearing of such colors could be seen as a
political statement at the polling place.
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buttons."1 2 3 One of the defendants included an affidavit stating "that
no one will be prohibited from voting, but individuals who wear the
buttons or apparel will be (1) asked to remove or cover the apparel and
(2) the names of individuals refusing to do so will be noted for possible
referral to the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)."' 2 4
In its order, the court engaged in a temporary restraining order
analysis. 125 The court also noted that the timing of the motion did "not
weigh in favor of granting injunctive relief."126
The plaintiffs claimed they were being singled out by the state
authorities.'
The court described the evidence supporting the
plaintiffs' claim of being singled out as "mere speculation." 2 8 No
further description of the plaintiffs' evidence was provided. Immediately
following the "mere speculation" statement, the court stated:
that the buttons are designed to affect the actual voting process at the
polls by intimating that voters are required to show identification
before voting. This intimation could confuse voters and election
officials and cause voters to refrain from voting because of increased
delays or the misapprehension that identification is required. The
buttons are also associated with a political movement to require voters
to produce identification. The Tea Party apparel communicates
support for the Tea Party movement which is associated with certain
candidates and political views.12 9
The court did not describe what evidence was presented by the
defendants to support the court's findings regarding the alleged
intimation to voters. From the order, it appears that the court was
engaging in its own "mere speculation." Ultimately, the court held that
prohibiting the wearing of the buttons and shirts was reasonably related
to a legitimate state interest: '"maintain[ing] peace, order, and decorum'
at the polls."o3 0 It also determined that the plaintiffs would not prevail

123. Minn. Majority, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116240, at *4.
124. Id. at *5.
125. Id. at *5-6. The factors reviewed when determining whether to grant a temporary
restraining order are: "(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the
balance between this harm and the injury .. . granting the injunction will inflict on the
other party; (3) the probability of the movant succeeding on the merits; and (4) the public
interest." Id. at *6 (quoting Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d 685, 689-90 (8th Cir. 2008)).
126. Id. at *5.
127. Id. at *9.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *9-10.
130. Id. at *10 (alteration in original) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966)).
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on the merits based on the Supreme Court's decision in Burson v.
Freemans3 and that the polling room was not a public forum.'a
After the election, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.'a In
response, the defendants brought motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(bX6).' 4 The matter was heard and the
court granted the defendants' motions dismissing the plaintiffs' claims
with prejudice.'
The court provided a strong basis for its opinion by
noting that the polling room is a non-public forum."' It succinctly
summed up the standard by stating, "[riestrictions on speech in
nonpublic fora are allowed as long as they are viewpoint neutral and
reasonable in light of the purposes served by the forum." 3 ' The court
did not rely on Burson to support its conclusions (noting that Burson
was focused on the area outside the polling room).'a Accordingly, the
plaintiffs' amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice. 13
b. The Campaign-Free Zone. The area outside the polling room
is also included in the campaign-free zone.14 0 Forty-seven states and
the District of Columbia have non-campaign zones extending from the

131. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
132. Minn. Majority, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116240, at *4, 5.

133. Minn. Majority v. Mansky, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1117 (D. Minn. 2011). The
amended complaint was comprised of four counts:
(1) that Minnesota Statutes [§] 211.111, subdivision 1, is a facially unconstitutional restriction of First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and
parallel rights under the Minnesota constitution (Count IV); (2) that [§1 211B.11,
as applied in the Election Day Policy adopted by Hennepin and Ramsey Counties
and the [Minnesota] Secretary of State, violated [the] [pilaintiffs' First Amendment rights, their constitutionally protected right to vote, and parallel rights
under the Minnesota constitution (Counts I and IV); (3) that the Election Day
Policy violated [the] [p]laintiffs' due process rights under both the United States
and Minnesota constitutions (Count II); and (4) that the Election Day Policy
deprived the [plaintiffs of equal protection under both the United States and
Minnesota constitutions (Count III).
Id. at 1119.
134. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6); Minn. Majority, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides a defense of "failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted" to defendants. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Such a motion must be filed before
the defendant files its answer or such a defense is waived. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
135. Minn. Majority, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
136. Id. at 1121.
137. Id.
138.

Id.

139. Id. at 1133.
140. James J. Woodruff II, Where the Wild Things Are: The Polling Place, Voter
Intimidation,and the FirstAmendment, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 253, 279 (2011).
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entrance of the polling place to a fixed distance.'
Vermont, Oregon,
and Washington are the only states that do not have campaign-free
zones. 142
Not surprisingly, the campaign-free zone has been the subject of some
litigation over the years. The hallmark case on the constitutionality of
the campaign-free zone is Burson.'4 3 In 1992 the Supreme Court
rendered its opinion in Burson, where the State of Tennessee banned
campaigning within one hundred feet of polling places.144
In Burson, the plaintiff filed a declaratory action attacking the
constitutionality of the campaign-free zone under both the Tennessee

141. ALA. CODE § 17-9-50 (2006) (30 feet); ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.170 (2010) (200 feet);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-411(2010) (75 feet); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-103(a)(9) (2010) (100
feet); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 319.5 (West 2010) (100 feet); COLo. REV. STAT. § 1-13-714 (2010)
(100 feet); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-236 (2010) (75 feet); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4933 (2010)
(50 feet); D.C. CODE § 1-1001.10(b)(2)(a) (2010) (50 feet); FLA. STAT. § 102.031(3)(c) (2011)
(100 feet); O.C.G.A. § 21-2-414(a) (2011) (150 feet); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-132 (2010) (200
feet); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-2318 (2010) (100 feet); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-41(c) (2010)
(100 feet); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-5-2-10 (50-foot chute); IOWA CODE § 39A.4 (2009) (300 feet);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2413 (2011) (250 feet); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.235 (2010) (300
feet); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1462 (2010) (600 feet); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21A, § 682(2)
(2010) (250 feet); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAw § 16-206 (2010) (100 feet); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 54, § 65 (2010) (150 feet); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.744 (2010) (100 feet); MINN. STAT.
§ 204C.06 (2010) (100 feet); Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-895 (2010) (150 feet); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 115.637 (2010) (25 feet); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-211(1) (2010) (100 feet); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 32-1524(2) (2010) (200 feet); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.361(1) (2009) (100
feet); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659:43 (2011) (a 10-foot corridor that extends to a distance
at the discretion of the election moderator); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:34-15 (West 2010) (100
feet); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-16 (2011) (100 feet); N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 17-130 (Consol. 2010)
(100 feet); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-166.4 (2010) (50 feet); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-03
(100 feet); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.30(4) (West 2010) (100 feet); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26,
§ 7-108 (2010) (300 feet); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 25-14-3060(d) (2011) (10 feet from
polling place); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-19-49 (2010) (50 feet); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-25-180 (2010)
(200 feet); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-18-3 (2010) (100 feet); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-111
(2010) (100 feet); TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 61.003 (West 2011) (100 feet); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 20A-3-501 (2010) (150 feet); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604 (2011) (40 feet); W. VA. CODE § 39-6 (2010) (300 feet); Wis. STAT. § 12.03(2Xb) (2010) (100 feet); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-26113 (2010) (100 yards).
142. Such a zone would be impossible to have in Oregon because the state only allows
voting by mail. OREGON REVISED STAT. § 254.465 (2009). Washington has followed
Oregon's lead, but maintains a polling place in one county. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.40.150
(2011).
143. 504 U.S. 191.
144. Burson, 504 U.S. at 191, 193. There had been challenges to campaign-free zones

before the Burson case. See generally Dunham, supra note 8, at 2137 (discussing the many
state and federal cases that reviewed campaign-free zones prior to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Burson).
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The plaintiff was
constitution and the United States Constitution."
politically active and claimed that the statute against electioneering
near the polling room "limited her ability to communicate with
voters."4 ' The statute under attack read as follows:
Within the appropriate boundary as established in subsection (a) [100
feet from the entrances], and the building in which the polling place is
located, the display of campaign posters, signs or other campaign
materials, distribution of campaign materials, and solicitation of votes
for or against any person or political party or position on a question are
prohibited.
The Tennessee Supreme Court overruled the trial court and held that
the statute was unconstitutional."4 '
A plurality of justices on the United States Supreme Court held that
the campaign-free zone was a "facially content-based restriction on
political speech in a public forum.""
Because it was deemed a
content-based restriction, a state must prove that the speech restriction
was "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it [was]
narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'
Tennessee offered as a
compelling interest that the voters should have the right to vote for the
candidate of their choice and to ensure election integrity and reliability. 5 1 To ensure that Tennessee had a compelling interest in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud, the Court engaged in a review
of election history in Tennessee.152
In Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion he "elaborat[ed] on the
meaning of the term 'content based'" as used in the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence. 5 3 Justice Kennedy was in favor of the
speech restrictions upheld by the majority as the restrictions were
necessary to protect "another constitutional right": the right to vote.154
He explained that to have a content based restriction on speech, the
speech being restricted should fall within a "recognized category

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Burson, 504 U.S. at 194.
Id.
Id. at 193-94 (alterations in original) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 193, 198.
Id. at 198 (quoting Perry Edue. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45).
Id. at 198-99.
Id. at 205-06.
Id. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 213-14.

§ 2-7-111(b)).

2014]1

ELECTION DAY AT THE POLLS

351

permitting suppression" and that protecting other constitutional rights
was one of these recognized categories.'55
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion called into question the applicability of the public-forum doctrine to campaign-free zones.156 He believed
that the easier solution was to declare the campaign-free zone a nonpublic forum rather than to engage in an unnecessary analysis of an
area that is not a "traditional public forum."15 ' He surmised that even
though some campaign-free zones may include sidewalks and streets,
these locations (based on the long history of the Tennessee statute) were
not "quintessential public forums."55 He stated that "at least [thirtyfour] of the [forty-five] [sltates . .. had enacted such restrictions" as of
1900, and that the campaign-free zones had "traditionally not been
devoted to assembly and debate."" Justice Scalia based his opinion
on the fact that not all "[s]treets and sidewalks" are public forums and
that "the long usage of our people demonstrates that portions of streets
and sidewalks adjacent to polling places are not public forums at all
times." 6 ' Not only were the facts and law in support of finding the
campaign-free zone a non-public forum, Justice Scalia pointed out that
as a matter of policy it was "less confusing to acknowledge that the
environs of a polling place, on election day, are simply not a 'traditional
public forum'-which means that they are subject to speech restrictions
that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.""'
The plurality's opinion was met with a dissent written by Justice
Stevens and joined in by Justices O'Conner and Souter.' 62 The
dissenters argued that the Tennessee statute prohibited conduct and
speech that was "classic political expression.",63 They argued for the
"long recognized" standing of the Supreme Court with regard to political
expression by invoking Buckley v. Valeo'sl 64 famous passage:
[D]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Consitution. The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression in order "to assure [the]

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 212, 213.
Id. at 216 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 214.
Id.
Id. at 214-16.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 216 (quoting PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46).
Id. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.""s
It is here that the dissenters agreed with the plurality that a state must
pass the strict-scrutiny standard of review."' They also agreed that
"protectling] orderly access to the polls" was a "compelling state
interest."'67 These, of course, were the only parts of the plurality's
opinion with which they agreed.
The dissenters took issue with the effect the statute had on "lastminute campaigning.""6 s The dissenters also called into question
Tennessee's need for a three hundred-foot campaign-free zone in twelve
of the state's ninety-five counties.' 69 What struck the dissenters as
odd was the existence of variations in campaign-free zones nationwide.'
While some zones were one hundred feet in circumference,
other zones ranged from fifty feet to five hundred feet.'
Then the dissenters turned to the meat of the issue, the key problem,
that Tennessee's "statute [did] not merely regulate conduct that might
inhibit voting; it bar[red] the simple 'display of campaign posters, signs
or other campaign materials.'"172 But the restrictions did not stop
there- "[blumper stickers on parked cars and lapel buttons on pedestrians [were] taboo" as well."7 The dissent even called the plurality's
opinion that the "sweeping restrictions on speech are necessary to
maintain the freedom to vote and the integrity of the ballot box
'absurd."174
According to the dissenting Justices, the evidence produced at trial
supporting the campaign-free zone "was exceptionally thin."7 7 They
attacked the plurality's analysis as "confus[ing] history with necessity,"
stating that "necessity must be demonstrated."176 Further, the dissenters brought into question whether the campaign-free zone was necessary
when it was originally adopted.'7 7 They believed that alternative

165. Burson, 504 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (last alteration in original)
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 217-18.
168. Id. at 224.
169. Id. at 218.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 218-19 (alteration in original) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-111(b)).
173. Id. at 219.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 220-21.
177. Id. at 220.
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electoral reforms, other than making a large political-free zone, were
available to deter the conduct sought to be curtailed by the zone."'
Attacks were also made on the tradition argument by holding the
Court's past history with Tennessee's electoral traditions." 9 The Court
pointed to the cases of Dunn v. Blumstein'80 and Baker v. Carrsi' as
demonstrating the apparent problems with relying on Tennessee's
electoral traditions. 1 82 Dunn involved a one-year residency requirement, and Baker involved legislative reapportionment.1 3
The dissenters also attacked the current necessity of campaign-free
zones." They noted that no findings were made regarding why such
zones were necessary in the modern world of campaigns and elections.185 In fact, the dissenters were greatly persuaded by a number
of lower-court campaign-free-zone cases that had resulted in findings
that the zones were no longer necessary.' 6
Justice Stevens along with his fellow dissenters took aim at the broad
sweep of Tennessee's law."' They believed that the speech restrictions
were indeed content-based, 8 8 focusing on the fact that the law allowed
exit polling and silences only "campaign-related expression" while
allowing expression on all other topics.'"' They pointed out that
testimony introduced at trial showed that "several groups of candidates
rely heavily on last-minute campaigning."' 90 Those groups included
"candidates for lower visibility offices, and 'grassroots' candidates."'
Despite the plurality's recognition that the speech restrictions were
content-based, dissenters argued that the plurality failed to establish
that such restrictions were "related to any purported state interest."192
To make matters worse, the dissent pointed out that the plurality did
The
not even inquire whether the restrictions were necessary.'
dissent concluded by stating that the state did "not have a legitimate

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 221-22.
405 U.S. 330 (1972).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Burson, 504 U.S. at 221-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 221-22.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225.
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interest in insulating voters from election-day campaigning,"194 and
opining that "[tihe hubbub of campaign workers outside a polling place
may be a nuisance, but it is also the sound of a vibrant democracy."'
Once a decision was reached in Burson, it became a factor in a number
of election related cases. We have already seen its use in the Minnesota
Majority v. Mansky case discussed in Part II.B.2.a. Additional cases
have felt the effect of Burson in Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan, and New
York. 9m
The issue of whether Kentucky's restriction on electioneering was
overbroad became an issue in Anderson v. Spear.' While the appellant challenged the statute on two grounds, we will focus on the attack
Specifically, it was argued that
on the definition of electioneering"
the definition was overbroad because it included political speech not
advocating in favor of or against a public candidate. 9
In Anderson, the appellant was running as a write-in candidate and
wanted to hand out instructions "on how to cast a write-in vote."200
The Kentucky Board of Elections had informed him that engaging in
such an act was "electioneering" under the electioneering restrictions.
Kentucky's definition of electioneering included "the displaying of signs,
194. Id. at 227.
195. Id. at 228.
196. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1099 v. City of Sidney, 364 F.3d 738
(6th Cir. 2004); Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2004); Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty
& Mun. Emps. v. Land, 583 F. Supp. 2d 840, 848-49 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (upholding
Michigan's ban on wearing campaign paraphernalia in the campaign-free zone by basing
its decision on Burson and United Food); Cotz v. Mastroeni, 476 F. Supp. 2d 332, 364-65
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
197. 356 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 2004).
198. Id. The other ground was that the legislature's reasoning behind the 500-foot
campaign-free zone had scant evidence supporting the premise that the electioneering
restrictions were for the prevention of voter intimidation and corruption. Id. at 658. In
fact, it appeared from the record that the support for the electioneering ban was voter
convenience. Id. at 660. In overturning the campaign-free-zone statute, the court
specifically found the following section of the record to be interesting:
You know, it was almost impossible to get in to vote. You had handfuls of cards
that people came in, threw down in the floor, threw down in the polling booth,
because they weren't interested in those. And I remember, you know, the first
election when we had the 5001-foot] ban, I had, you know, comment after comment
from people, that this was the way elections should be, that, you know, they didn't
have to run the gauntlet, they didn't have to take all these cards that they didn't
want to take, because they didn't want to offend people by not taking their card.
It really has changed the appearance of the polling places. You don't have the
crowds hanging around on election day.
Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 665.
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the distribution of campaign literature, cards, or handbills, the soliciting
of signatures to any petition, or the solicitation of votes for or against
any candidate or question on the ballot in any manner, but [did] not
include exit polling."20 1 In response, Anderson argued that the term
"electioneering," so defined, was defined encompassed constitutionally
protected speech. 20 2 Agreeing with the appellant, the court held that
Kentucky's campaign-free-zone statute was overbroad because "it
prohibitled] more speech than [was] necessary to meet the [s]tate's
protected interest."2 03 To illustrate the court's reasoning, the court
provided an example of how unlimited the statute's restrictions were in
practice:
While Mr. Anderson's particular speech-[for example], providing
instructions on how to vote for write-in candidates-at first glance
looks like a relatively narrow class of speech, his legal challenge to a
definition of electioneering which includes issue advocacy raises
constitutional concerns about a broad class of speech. The Kentucky
State Board of Elections fails to explain why providing instructions on
how to cast a write-in vote would constitute "electioneering" for the
purposes of the statute. Thus, as best we can tell, the Kentucky law
as interpreted by the Board of Elections would forbid an individual to
remind voters to fill in the ovals completely on optical scan ballots.
Given the Board's decision, it would also appear that individuals would
be prohibited from displaying signs or distributing leaflets which fall
into core issue advocacy: that is, promoting issues rather than specific
candidates. If "electioneering" includes Mr. Anderson's instructing
voters on how to cast a write-in vote, does it also include, for example,
parents urging voters to "support our schools"? All issue-related speech
is chilled by the Board's interpretation of "electioneering." However,
the [sitate has failed to provide evidence to support a finding either
that a regulation so broad is necessary to prevent corruption and voter
intimidation, or that the regulation does not significantly impinge on
the rights protected by the First Amendment.2 "
The restriction of electioneering in private parking lots and public

sidewalks was addressed in United Food & Commercial Workers Local
1099 v. City of Sidney.20 s In United Food, the appellants had sought
to collect signatures for a referendum petition in Ohio. 0 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the appellants'

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.235(3)).
Id. at 663.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 665.
364 F.3d 738, 743 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 742.
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case and held that it was lawful to restrict speech on public parking lots
and sidewalks if they fall within the campaign-free zone.207 The court
also noted that when the state opens up a school or other private or
public forum for voting, such forums are opened solely for the holding of
elections.20 s Opening up these areas for voting does not open these
areas up for other forms of expression.209
C.

The Area Outside the Campaign-FreeZone
The classification of property and the accompanying free-speech rights
return to their "regular" status once one steps outside the polling room
and campaign-free zone.21 Tis caR cause confusion on Election Day
as many polling sites are not located in government buildings or on
government property. It is not out of the ordinary to have churches,
union halls, and veterans' associations serve as polling sites. When this
occurs, citizens who are seeking to influence the electorate may run afoul
of private-property rights.
This area was recently at issue in Liberty Township Tea Party v.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local
648.211 In Liberty Township, the plaintiffs had set up a table "to solicit
petitions to 'Stop Obama Care' and to end estate taxes."21 2 During
past elections, one of the plaintiffs, Ms. Dirr, had actively campaigned
outside the union hall location for various candidates and causes. The
table was located outside the campaign-free zone and on the grass next
to the handicap parking spot at the union hall. The exact location was
disputed at trial, but all parties agree it was outside the campaign-free
zone. From her table Ms. Dirr solicited people to sign her petitions. At
some point a union official approached her and told her she needed to
leave. Ms. Dirr's recollection of the conversation, which differed from the
union member's, was that the election supervisor stated that she must
take the union's viewpoint into account.2"'
The Liberty Township Tea Party and Ms. Dirr filed a lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The
plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief and damages from the
defendants.214 While the court denied the plaintiffs' requests for relief,

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 751.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 749.
Id.
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142839 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2010).
Id.
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *1-2.
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it did provide guidance to all the parties involved. 2 15 The court, citing
United Food, stated that the "areas surrounding a polling place may
become a designated public forum if there is evidence of expressive
activity occurring on the property that goes beyond each voter casting
his or her ballot.""'6
The union that owned the property being used as a polling site had
allowed the placement of political signs "on the grass immediately to the
left and right of the driveways. 21 7 The union had also permitted
"individuals to engage in political discourse near the walkways or front
parking lot leading to the polling location."218 The court found that the
union, by allowing these activities to take place, had "opened up these
portions of its property to expressive activity and had] intertwined itself
with a function exclusively reserved to the [sitate, that is, the administration of elections."1
Specifically, that area had, because of the
union's actions, become open not to the wide range of free speech, but to
political discourse.220
Those who suffer speech restrictions outside the campaign-free zone
may have additional remedies for the unlawful restriction of their
speech. In United Food, the appellants had filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983221
claim against the county sheriff's department for its actions taken
against them outside the campaign-free zone. 22 2 A sheriff's deputy
threatened to arrest the appellants if they continued to solicit petition
signatures on the sidewalk outside the campaign-free zone at the
Y.M.C.A. 223 The court of appeals overturned the trial court's order
dismissing the plaintiffs' claim against the county sheriff's department.2 24

215. Id. at *22. The denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order
was based on the presence of conflicting testimony between Ms. Dirr and Mr. McGuffey.
Id. at *18-19. The court held that the "[pilaintiffs' claims hinge[d] upon the credibility
determination to be made by the finder of fact" and, therefore, the "[plaintiffs have not
shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claim."
Id. at *19.
216. Id. at *12 (citing United Food, 364 F.3d at 749-50).
217.

Id.

218. Id. at *13.
219. Id.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
United Food, 364 F.3d at 745-46.
Id. at 741-42.
Id. at 753.
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TO RESTRICT OR NOT RESTRICT: THAT IS THE QUESTION 225

States have been running elections for public office for well over two
hundred years. 2 26 During that time there has been a diverse methodology for the operation and regulation of these activities.227 In the
majority of states, today's election sites look similar from state to
To determine whether passive electioneering should be
state. 2 '
banned at the polling site, as earlier stated, we are going to review the
restrictions under both an originalist philosophy and policy-based
philosophy.
A. The OriginalistPhilosophy's Treatment of Restriction on Passive
Electioneeringat the Polling Site
This topic presents us with a unique opportunity to engage in an
originalist analysis regarding the First Amendment's Free Speech
Clause. During the First Amendment's ratification process, there were
polling places and politics that revolved around competing candidates
and political parties.2 2 9 We can easily determine what the general
public would have believed the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech meant in the context of a polling place. Things, politically, were
not so different then. Various forms of media then in existence
advocated for candidates and provided the political commercials of the
day.230 Candidates and parties ran campaigns to win at the ballot box
on election day.231 There is no need to consider the restrictions of who
may be an elector at that time period; the issue is the freedom to
passively electioneer at the polling place and not the right to vote.232
225. Paraphrasing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET PRINCE OF
DENMARK, act 3, sc. 1.
226. BISHOP, supra note 41, at 220.
227. See supra Part I.A.
228. Oregon operates only one polling place, and has moved its election process to a
mail-in format. OR. REV. STAT. § 254.465. Voters no longer are allowed to exercise their
franchise in the traditional manner, due to the replacement of the ballot box with the
mailbox.
229. BISHOP, supra note 41, at 120.
230. Volokh, supra note 30, at 311-12.
231. BISHOP, supra note 41, at 120-21.
232. The ability to be an elector in the 1700s looked much different than today.
Restrictions such as land or property ownership were standard practices at the time.
William Blackstone defended the practice of property ownership as a prerequisite for
elections in his Commentaries on the Laws of England:
The true reason of requiring any qualification, with regard to property, in voters,
is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed
to have no will of their own. If these persons had votes, they would be tempted to
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It is in using this wealth of law and tradition that we will be able to
formulate both a proper view of intentionalism and original public
meaning. 233
The drafters and ratifiers of the First Amendment contended with a
myriad of election environments. As illustrated in Part II.A of this
Article, they were familiar with quite a few differing methods of
conducting elections, most of which were used within some of the
members' living memories. Such voting methods included viva voce,
showing of hands, bean or corn count, and by ballot.2 34 We can even
go further and review the polling-room procedures enacted at the time
by state legislatures and municipal bodies."'
Georgia's Act of June 9, 1761, provided for "the manner and form of
Electing Members to represent the Inhabitants of [Georgia] in the
Commons House of Assembly."236 The Act covered everything from the
qualifications of electors to the process at the polling room. 3 The only
expressly restricted speech is that of intimidation by the provost
marshal. 2 38 The Act states:
[If the Provost Marshal ... shall influence or endeavor to influence or
persuade any Voter not to vote as he first designed shall forfeit for
each and every such offen[se] the sum of fifty pounds Sterling to be to
his Majesty for defraying the expen[se] of the sitting of the General

dispose of them under some undue influence or other. This would give a great, an
artful, or a wealthy man, a larger share in elections than is consistent with
general liberty.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 165 (Univ. Chi. Press
photo., reprint 1979) (1765). Benjamin Franklin also commented on the practice. He
described the logic behind the necessary ownership of property being a precondition to vote:
Today a man owns a jackass worth fifty dollars and he is entitled to vote; but
before the next election the jackass dies. The man in the mean time has become
more experienced, his knowledge of the principles of government, and his
acquaintance with mankind, are more extensive, and he is therefore better
qualified to make a proper selection of rulers-but the jackass is dead and the
man cannot vote. Now gentlemen, pray inform me, in whom is the right of
suffrage? In the man or in the jackass?
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE CASKET, OR FLOWERS OF LITERATURE, WIT AND SENTIMENT 4
(Philadelphia, 1828); quoted in ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT 'o VOTE: THE CONTESTED
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2000).

233. Intentionalism and original public meaning are the two widely accepted schools
of thought in the originalist movement.
234. EVANS, supra note 33, at 1.
235. BISHOP, supra note 41, at 226-35 (discussing the procedures for municipal elections
in colonial America). See also id. at 269-88 (providing the state acts concerning elections).
236. Id. at 279.
237. Id. at 279-87.
238. Id. at 285.
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Assembly and to be sued for and recovered in the General Court of this
Province by Bill Plaint or Information.' 9
The Act, however, did include a provision for unforeseen circumstances,
but those were to be handled after the completion of the election.24 0
Such a provision could plausibly allow for the punishment of speech at
the polling place, but such issues would have been handled on a case-bycase basis.
Taking into consideration the atmosphere at the polls during the late
eighteenth century, it is unlikely that the wearing of political slogans
would have been found offensive. In fact, the example of voting viva
voce provided by John Sergeant Wise would make the idea of restricting
campaign or electioneering speech at the polling room rather ludicrous.
Wise provided the following example of how voting viva voce was
conducted: 'The judges inquired, 'John Jones (or Bill Smith), for whom
do you vote?'--for governor, or for whatever was the office to be filled. He
replied by proclaiming the name of his favorite."241
Based on the election laws and methods of the eighteenth century, it
would appear that those who ratified the Free Speech Clause would have
found the restriction of passive electioneering offensive. Having come to
a resolution of the originalist philosophy on the matter of passive
electioneering, we now turn to how the policy-based philosophy would
resolve the issue.
B. A Review of Restricting Passive Electioneering at the Polling Site
Based on a Policy-Based Philosophy
The first question posed under the current policy-based philosophy
asks whether the speech being restricted is facing restriction in a
content-neutral manner.2 4 2 Once that is established, then we can look
to the location affected by the speech restriction to determine if the
speech can actually be restricted.
Restricting speech advocating for or against a politician, political
party, or ballot initiative is by its very nature the regulation of political
speech.2 3 The statutes against passive electioneering are rather
specific in the speech they prohibit. For example, a shirt or button
advertising a common everyday product, service, or pop-culture brand
would not be determined offensive under these statutes. Thus, the

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 284.
Id. at 285.
WISE, supra note 42, at 55-56.
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
Burson, 504 U.S. at 196.
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government is restricting speech in a content-specific manner when
restricting passive electioneering at the polling site.
We are now presented with two different standards to test the speech
restrictions against. Because the polling site is comprised of three zones,
one of which has been declared a non-public forum, the treatment given
to government-imposed speech restrictions varies. We shall begin by
examining the standard imposed on speech restrictions within the
campaign-free zone. The campaign-free zone extends from the door of
the polling room to some distance determined by the particular state's
legislature.2 44
As discussed earlier, the campaign-free zone has been classified as a
The government may
traditional or designated public forum.245
restrict speech in such forums if "the restrictions are 'necessary to serve
a compelling state interest and ...

narrowly drawn to achieve that

end."'24 6 Because the government is engaged in content-specific speech
restriction, the burden of proof rests on the government to show that the
regulation is constitutional.24 7
First, the question must be asked whether the restriction of passive
electioneering is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest."2 48 In
Burson, the Supreme Court found that the passive electioneering
restrictions in the campaign-free zone were necessary to serve the state's
interest in fighting fraud and intimidation at the polling place.249
While this may suffice for elections in Tennessee, the state where Burson
was brought, it does not hold true for all states. In Burson, the state
was able to show examples of voter intimidation and fraud by campaign
workers from the state's own history of elections supporting the need for
such speech restrictions. 25 0 Absent such a widespread abuse of the
election process as demonstrated in Tennessee, a state may lack the
compelling state interest necessary to engage in infringement of its
citizens' free-speech rights. Even Tennessee does not appear to have an
election history adequate to demonstrate the need to restrict passive
electioneering.
To support the speech restrictions, the state would have to prove that
banning passive electioneering from the campaign-free zone would

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Dunham, supra note 8, at 2143.
Burson, 504 U.S. at 198.
Woodruff, supra note 140, at 278 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45).
Burson, 504 U.S. at 208.
PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
Burson, 504 U.S. at 198.
Id. at 206.
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"maintain peace, order and decorum" at the polling place.25 1 Clearly
the state has a compelling interest in this instance.
But the analysis does not end there. The speech restrictions must also
be narrowly tailored to meet the state's necessity for the law."' How
the banning of the wearing of political slogans and images would in any
way ensure "peace, order and decorum" may be difficult to see.
One argument supporting the need for regulating the wearing of such
political paraphernalia at the polls may be based on America's current
partisan divide. As partisan lines have hardened and the existence of
centrists holding office has all but disappeared, the rhetoric in the
political arena has become quite heated in recent years. Heated political
rhetoric is nothing new to American politics, but access to information
and the ability to push messaging to every American is what has
changed the landscape. While only a minority of Americans watch the
cable news, those individuals who do watch these stations are heavily
invested in the outcome of certain elections. This current atmosphere
could cause disruptions at the polling place. Banning the wearing of
political paraphernalia in the polling room and at the polling place
removes a stimulus that could lead to a situation that may cause voters
delays at the polling place.
The limiting of active in-person campaigning by individuals supports
the compelling interest of keeping order at the polling place, but the
restriction of campaign messaging placed in that zone does not further
the keeping of order. The mere placement of signs, stickers, or similar
media on voters or in the campaign-free zone does not support order at
the polls. While active human campaigners can engage in mischief,
passive electioneering, by its very nature, cannot.
An additional issue presented itself during the 2012 election cycle that
went against the idea that banning passive electioneering will bring
peace, order, and decorum to the polling place. In 2012, there were
complaints of lines at polling places in several states.25 3 Those in line
waited for up to several hours to cast their ballots.254 Burdening
election workers with the added task of policing what voters wear to the
polling place slows down the voting process. Additionally, the attempt
to enforce the passive-electioneering prohibition may lead to altercations
and arguments, thereby slowing down the already slow voting process

251. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
252. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
253. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Waiting Times at Ballot Boxes Draw Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 4,2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/05/US/politics/waiting-times-to-voteat-polls-draw-scrutiny.html?_r-O.
254. Id.
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during a presidential-election cycle. Any disruption caused by the
wearing of political paraphernalia can be handled by law enforcement,
like any other situation that may arise at the polling place on election

day.255
Campaign signs should also be allowed placement within the
campaign-free zone. The signs, like the slogans on shirts or buttons, are
inert. They cannot reach out and touch or impede the flow of people
coming to the polling place. I suppose that as technology gets less
expensive there may be signs used in the future that project video
messages or even two-way communication with people passing by.
However, such a world does not currently exist for today's campaigns
and elections. And while it may exist at some point in the future, the
standard of strict scrutiny does not look into the future for distant
possibilities.
If allowed, the number of signs placed by a campaign within the
campaign-free zone should be limited. One sign per candidate or
campaign should be sufficient to allow for adequate political expression
while not cluttering or causing disruptions in the campaign-free zone.
Failure to place some restriction on the amount of signage in the
campaign-free zone could lead to a wallpapering of campaign messaging
up to the polling-room door. It may also lead to heated disputes as
campaigners attempt to obscure the signs of competing campaigns within
the zone. These limitations should meet constitutional scrutiny because
reasonable restrictions can be made on the time, place, and manner of
political expression.5
The issue of passive electioneering within the polling room becomes
more difficult. Because the polling room is a non-public forum, it is
governed by the reasonableness standard-the restrictions must be
"reasonable and .

.

. not an effort to suppress expression merely because

public officials oppose the speaker's view."2 57 As a means of examining
the reasonableness of restrictions on passive electioneering at the polling
place, we shall review some instances that occurred during the 2012
election cycle.

255. Some states have laws that forbid the presence of law enforcement at the polling
place. In such states, the response would likely be delayed. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE.
§ 18544 (Dearing 2003). The reasoning for the laws restricting the presence of law
enforcement seems to focus on the idea that law enforcement's presence may deter certain
voters.
256. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
257. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (citing
Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45).
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One example of passive electioneering is the placement of signs or
messages within the polling room. During the 2012 presidential election
cycle, a polling room in Philadelphia contained a mural on the wall next
to the voting booths.258 The mural was a large painting of President
Barack Obama and was surrounded by a number of quotes attributed to
him.2 59 The major problem with this was that President Obama was
on the ballot seeking re-election during that cycle. Such a presentation
may make members of the party opposing the sitting president
squeamish to vote, especially in a precinct where they may be a minority
facing an overwhelming majority. Such displays at the polling place can
be reminiscent of the treatment political minorities received in the Jim
Crow era. To avoid intimidation, or the appearance of intimidation, such
displays should not be present in the polling place.
The mural of President Obama in the polling place does raise an
interesting question: In what circumstances may a polling place have a
politician's image or sayings on display? The Democratic Party and
Republican Party have both been in existence for well over 150
years.260 During that time, they have each produced a number of
historically popular politicians. Would the image of Abraham Lincoln,
or quotes attributed to him, be objectionable? He was, after all, the first
Republican elected to the presidency. What about Andrew Jackson, the
first Democrat elected to the presidency? Possibly the passage of time
has sterilized the political beliefs and affiliations of those so distant in
time. Would the image or quotes of Robert Kennedy or Ronald Reagan
create more controversy? In all fairness, it is probably best to avoid the
use of any politicians that can be connected to the current political
parties we know. After all, voter intimidation is based on a subjective
standard, and erring on the side of caution should be the preferred
standard in protecting voters' civil rights.261
Another factor to consider is enforcement. In short, this can be wildly
inconsistent. It would be consistent to believe that if a restriction is
reasonable, enforcement of that restriction would be uniform throughout
the state. For example, Kimberly J. Tucker, in her article "You Can't
Wear That to Vote".- The Constitutionalityof State Laws Prohibitingthe

258. Philly Poll Workers PartiallyCover Obama MuralAfter Court Order,Leaving Logo
and Quote in View, Fox NEws, Nov. 6, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/11/06/
judge-issuing-order-to-reinstate-booted-philadelphia-election-officials/.
259. Id.
260. RICHARD ROSE, UNDERSTANDING POST-COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATION: A BOTTOM
UP APPROACH 55 (2009).
261. Woodruff, supra note 140, at 266.

2014]

ELECTION DAY AT THE POLLS

365

Wearing of Political Message Buttons at Polling Places,"' provides an
example of when anti-electioneering laws are enforced.2"
scribes her experience as follows:

She de-

As I stepped into the polling place to vote during the highly contested
2004 Presidential Election, a Virginia election official told me that I
had to take off my "John Kerry for President" button in order to vote.
My response to him was "that is not a law." When the official
protested, I said, "show me the law," and she brought over a book of
rules. Virginia law states that it is unlawful for "any ... voter. . . in
the room . . . to . . . exhibit any ballot, ticket, or other campaign

material to any person." I told the official that whether I must take off
my button is a question of interpretation of the phrase "other campaign
material." My argument was that wearing a button to the poll is a
silent expression of speech protected by the First Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. Furthermore, allowing an individual
voter to wear a political message button to the polling place was not
the type of illegal campaigning intended to be prohibited by the
statute. The official then threatened to call the police. I informed her
that this was not necessary and questioned if I had worn a John Kerry
t-shirt, would I have to take it off. She responded that I would be
required to go into the bathroom and turn the shirt around. She again
threatened to call the police. Finally, I acquiesced to her demands, but
stated my position that her actions were unconstitutional."
Her experience shows an individual offended by being asked to remove
a campaign button. She even argued with the poll worker about her
While such an argument with a poll
perceived constitutional rights."
worker is futile (constitutional arguments are best left for courts and not
stressed-out poll workers), it illustrates the injury perceived by some
voters confronted by these laws. Additionally, the poll workers receive
the brunt of enforcement. These workers are likely short-term employees who are just trying to follow the rules that have been given to
them.266 Failure to do so may lead to them losing their jobs. Some
poll workers rely upon these jobs to supplement family incomes.
My experience with enforcement of the polling place speech restriction
laws has been much different than that of Professor Tucker. During the
2012 election cycle, I observed the election process in Nevada. Nevada
has a law that forbids the wearing of election paraphernalia in the

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Tucker, supra note 2.
Id. at 61.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604(D)).
Id.
See Woodruff supra note 140, at 263.
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267
During early voting, I watched as voters waited in
polling room.
lines for up to half an hour to exercise their franchise. During that time
voters showed up wearing shirts emblazoned with their candidate's logo
or image. These shirts provided messages of support. Additionally,
various special-interest groups were represented in the line. Shirts
stating the wearer's membership in a wide range of groups from
organized labor to civil-rights organizations were present. It does not
make sense to ban the wearing of a candidate's or a political party's logo
or likeness, but to allow special-interest groups to advocate as walking
billboards. None of the voters were asked to remove campaign paraphernalia before voting.
Additional examples of this inconsistency can be found during the
2008 election cycle. The plaintiffs in Mansky had also encountered
The
inconsistent enforcement of the passive electioneering ban.26
court summarized their allegations in their amended complaint as
follows:

One voter wearing a Tea Party T-Shirt was "interrupted" "during the
voting process" and asked to remove or cover his Tea Party T-Shirt.
He was warned that if he did not, he could be prosecuted. Some
Hennepin County election judges allowed individuals, including
Plaintiff Dorothy Fleming, to wear the "Please I.D. Me" buttons
without asking them to cover or remove the buttons. In unidentified
counties, unidentified voters were allowed to vote wearing buttons
affiliated with the Sierra Club and Minnesota Common Cause. The
Sierra Club endorses candidates and Minnesota Common Cause lobbies
for legislation to reform the electoral process.269
The lack of uniform enforcement of a passive electioneering restriction
argues against the reasonableness of the speech restrictions placed on
certain types of passive electioneering within the polling
room-specifically, the wearing of campaign or political paraphernalia by
voters. Additionally, the inconsistency in enforcement adds to the
confusion that disrupts the peace, order, and decorum at the polls.
Placing the burden of determining what constitutes campaign or
political paraphernalia on the poll workers can cause confusion. One of
the strangest occurrences during 2012 was the banning of Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) students from voting for wearing M.I.T.
sweatshirts.2 7 0 The students had appeared at the correct polling places

267. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.740 (2009).
268. Minn. Majority, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
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in Colorado and Florida.2 7' The election officials in Colorado had
determined that the shirts violated the state's anti-electioneering statute
and denied the student the right to vote until the sweatshirt was
removed. 7 ' The Florida case is perplexing; Florida does not have a
ban on wearing campaign or political paraphernalia in the polling
room. 2 In both cases, the poll workers thought the M.I.T. sweatshirts
were electionering for Mitt Romney, the Republican presidential
candidate.
The limitations placed on political expression by some of the current
statutes should be found unconstitutional for their over-breadth and
unreasonableness. At the core of the Free Speech Clause is political
speech. While some limitations are acceptable to keep order and
decorum at the polling place, these restrictions can be narrowly tailored
to achieve such an objective. Banning all political expression within a
designated zone does not meet the goal of a narrowly tailored solution.
IV.

CONCLUSION

While states may be able to manufacture the illusion of a compelling
interest in restricting expressive activity at the polling site, such an
illusion has no present factual basis when it comes to passive electioneering. The states currently exercising broad restrictions on political
expression at the polling place's campaign-free zone have failed to meet
the strict scrutiny necessary to support those restrictions. While inperson campaigning has been properly restricted as a means to maintain
order at the polling location, the presence of campaign paraphernalia
worn by voters should be allowed within the zone.
The simple presence of a campaign slogan on a shirt, button, or sticker
does not interfere with the elector's presence at the polling place. The
presence of such paraphernalia is transitory because voters are not
allowed to loiter inside the polling room after they have completed the
task of voting. Additionally, the limited placement of campaign signs
within the campaign-free or restricted zone should also be allowed. The
number of signs should be restricted to one per campaign to deter
overzealous campaigns from "wallpapering" the campaign-free zone with
pro-campaign messaging.
Additionally, the banning of political paraphernalia inside the polling
room does not meet the respective constitutional standards. While the
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reasonableness standard does not require that the restrictions be the
most reasonable, it still requires them to be reasonable. 27 4 It is
evident from the ability of states, without such a ban on passive
electioneering in the polling room, to maintain order and decorum that
such restrictions are not necessary or reasonable. This is further
supported by the ability to keep order in states where enforcement of the
speech restrictions is inconsistent.
Both the originalist philosophy and the policy-based philosophy of
constitutional interpretation support the overturning of the anti-passive
electioneering statutes. The overturning of these statutes will reduce
confusion at the polling place, and the burden of enforcing, or simply
ignoring, the law will be removed from election officials. The result will
be what was originally sought by the passage of these restrictions-peace,
order, and decorum.

274. See generally Burson, 504 U.S. at 209.

